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except for the division of utility regulation. The instant case dearly indicates that not all utility consumers are adequately protected. Adequate protection could best be furnished by legislation granting the Public Service
Commission regulatory powers over municipal utilities. 39 It will require
such legislation to provide an answer to the problem of proper utility consumer protection.
RONALD

E.

YOUNG

EMINENT DOMAIN: COMPENSATION FOR BUSINESS DAMAGES
IN FLORIDA
Young v. Hillsborough County, 215 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1968)
Petitioner owned and operated a hardware store, the front portion of which
was situated on condemned land. Part of the building was destroyed by the
taking of the condemned portion, thus necessitating the removal of the
remainder of the building from the uncondemned land. Petitioner alleged
that the county's action caused the destruction of his hardware business
since it was not economically feasible to continue operation at that location.
Petitioner sought damages for the value of the land and the building taken,
as well as compensation for damage to his business, under Florida Statutes,
section 73.071.: Damages were denied by the trial court, and the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed.2 The Supreme Court of Florida granted
certiorari and HELD, property owners are entitled to an award for business
damage in addition to the value of the property actually taken where the
property taken includes the front of a business building and such taking requires the subsequent removal of the entire building.3 Judgment reversed.
39. Fla. H.R. 580, Ist Sess. (1969), introduced in the 1969 session of the Florida
legislature, sought to amend FLA. STAT. §366.02 (1967) and to repeal FLA. STAT. §366.11
(1967), to remove the exemption of municipal public utilities from regulation by the
Public Service Commission. The bill died in committee.

1. FLA. STAT. §73.071 (3) (1967) provides: "The jury shall determine solely the amount
of compensation to be paid, which compensation shall include: (a) The value of the
property sought to be appropriated; and (b) Where less than the entire property is sought
to be appropriated, any damages to the remainder caused by the taking, including when
the action is by the state road department, county, municipality, board, district or other
public body for the condemnation of a right-of-way, and the effect of the taking of the
property involved may damage or destroy an established business of more than five years'
standing, owned by the party whose lands are being so taken, located upon adjoining
lands owned or held by such party, the probable damages to such business which the
denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause; any person claiming the
right to recover such special damages shall set forth in his written defenses the nature and
extent of such damages."
2. 206 So. 2d 405 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
3. 215 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1968).
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Eminent domain is legally justified on the theory that the state has an
original and absolute right of ownership in all land within its boundaries,
and that citizens hold land subject to the state's resumption of ultimate ownership.4 Under this power the state can take property for public use without the
owner's consent s subject, however, to the payment of just compensation.6 The
owner of a tract of land, part of which is taken for public use, is entitled not
only to compensation for that part of his land actually taken, but also for
injury resulting to the remainder. 7 This damage, called "severance damage,"
may occur when there is any element of value that arises out of the relationship of the condemned parcel to the tract of which it was a part.8 In order for
"severance damages" to be compensable there must be both an actual taking
of land and a relationship between that part taken and the remainder sufficient to indicate that compensation for injury to the remainder would in
effect be compensation for the taking. 9 Severance damages are distinguished

from "consequential damages," which do not flow immediately and directly
from the act of the condemning authority, but from a mere consequence of
such act. 10 Consequential damages are damnum absque injuria.1" The Supreme
Court of Florida has consistently held that under the Florida Constitution
there must be an actual physical invasion before such an injury can be compensable. 12 Therefore, consequential damages are not compensable.
The majority of American courts hold that business damage falls within

4. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 848-49 (Fla. 1964).
5. See generally Osceola County v. Triple E Dev. Co., 90 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1956);
Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930); Brest v.
Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 194 So. 2d 658 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
6. See generally Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So.
2d 289 (Fla. 1958); Board of Pub. Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor
Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); Myers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So.
2d 354 (1947); Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938);
City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
7. State Rd. Dep't v. Zetrouer, 105 Fla. 650, 142 So. 217 (1932); Orange Belt Ry. v.
Craver, 32 Fla. 28, 13 So. 444 (1893); City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
8. Worth v. City of West Palm Beach, 101 Fla. 868, 132 So. 689 (1931). The theoretical
basis for allowing compensation for injury to land remaining with the owner is that the
damage to the remainder area results directly and immediately from the taking of what was
originally an integral part of the land.
9. Note, Severance Damage in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 354,
356 (1957).
10. Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 575, 10 So. 457, 461 (1891).
11. Moore v. State Rd. Dep't, 171 So. 2d 25, 29 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965). The Latin
phrase refers to "damage without injury."
12. See generally Lewis v. State Rd. Dep't, 95 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1957); Weir v. Palm
Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So.
394 (1906); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891). See FLA. CONST.
Decl. of Rights §12 (1885); FLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §29 (1885). The newly enacted Florida
Constitution provides in article 10, §6(a) that: "No private property shall be taken or
damaged except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor . . . paid to
each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner."
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the category of consequential damages and is thus noncompensable. 13 Various
reasons are given for the maintenance of this policy. Chief among these is
that profits from a business are often too uncertain and speculative to become
the basis of an award from the courts.14 The true value of a business as. a
going concern depends upon a number of largely unascertainable factors,
such as the amount of capital invested, general business conditions, the skill
and ability of the proprietor, and the manner in which the owner conducts
his business.15 Because of the uncertain nature of damages suffered by business
concerns, courts have been very reluctant to allow recovery beyond the value
of the land actually taken by the condemning authority. In Sgarlat Estate v.
Commonwealth,- the Pennsylvania supreme court said -the state "does not
condemn an owner's business acumen or its results expressed in value. It
condemns his property, which one man may use exceeding [sic] well, another
ill, and a third not at all. The use of one's talents is a private, not a public
matter."17 Although the policy for the rule is unquestiofiably sound, there
is likewise no doubt that its strict application often results in hardship.
It is common knowledge that many businesses are completely dependent
upon their location for economic survival. Many small concerns draw their
trade almost exclusively from the residents of the areas in which they happen
to be located. In many instances, it has taken years to build a reputable
business with an assured clientele. Still other establishments are situated in
unique locations where their fronts provide maximum exposure to potential
customers. Often, no other suitable location can be found in an entire city.
In such situations the taking of adjacent land by the government often
works a greater hardshfp on the owner, of a business than would the actual
taking of the entire business. In attempts to alleviate this situation, only
Vermont 8 and Florida 9 have passed statutes that allow an award for business
damages suffered as a result of condemnation proceedings.
The Florida Legislature first provided compensation for business damage
in 1933.20 The original act was, with limited exceptions, similar to the current Florida Statutes, section 73.071, which provides in part that the sole
jury function is to determine what the compensation is to include and
13. See generally Douglass v. Hillsborough County, 206 So. 2d 402 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1968); accord, Wilden Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988 (US. Ct. Cl. 1966); Elson v. City
of Indianapolis, 246 Ind. 887, 204 N.E.2d 857 (1965); Johnson County Broadcasting Corp.
v. Iowa Highway Comxu'n, 256 Iowa 1251, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1964); Department of Highways
v. Rogers, 899 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1965). Contra, Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 146
S.E.2d 884 (1966). For a general treatment, see 2 P. NicnomS, THE LAw oF EMINENT
DOMAIN §5.76 (Sd ed. J. Sackman ed. 1968).
14. Department of Highways v. Ray, 892 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1965); Department of Highways v. Acme Brick Co., 162 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 1964); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n
v. McCardle, 248 Miss. 111, 137 So. 2d 793 (1962).
15. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 184.
16. 898 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960), cert. denied, .364 U.S. 817 (1960).

17. Id. at 409, 158 A.2d at 543.
18. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1904 (a) (1957),
19. FLA. STAT. §75.071 (8) (b) (1967).
20. Fla. Laws 1988, ch. 15927,
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what the amount shall be. 21 Additionally, the statute provides that the probable damages to a business are to be compensable when less than the owner's
entire property is to be appropriated and the business is located on the remaining land.

22

While the Florida statute departs radically from the general rule that
damages suffered by a business as a result of eminent domain proceedings
are noncompensable, an award under the statute is contingent upon the
presence of each of a series of limiting factors. The first element is that the
condemnation proceedings must constitute only a partial taking.23 Second,
the taking must be by the state road department or a county, municipality,
board, district, or other public body. 24 Further, the statute operates only in
25
proceedings for the condemnation of rights of way.

The First District Court of Appeal initially held that compensation for
business damage could be awarded only if the owner of the business also
owned the land on which it was located. -6 However, the court has since construed the statute to include a lessee of land under a written lease as an
"owner" of land in a constitutional sense, thereby allowing a recovery of business damages by the lessee for the partial taking of leased property in eminent
domain proceedings.2 7 Nevertheless, treatment of a lessee is no different from
that of a fee owner when the land upon which the business is located is condemned in its entirety. In such cases neither the lessee nor the owner is entitled
2
to compensation for business damages. 8
In addition to the foregoing limitations, the nature and extent of the
29
damage to the business in question must be specifically alleged and proved.
When proving the extent of damages, it has been held that courts must allow
admission of testimony of expert witnesses as to the business value of comparable business properties. 30 The statute further requires that a business
must have been in existence for at least five years in order to be eligible for
an award of business damages.2 1 This requirement has been held to be satisfied if the owner at the time of condemnation has not owned the business

21.
22.

FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.

§73.071 (3) (1967).
§73.071 (3) (b) (1967).

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. State Rd. Dep't v. Lewis, 170 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1964). FLA. STAT. §334.03 (15)
(1967) defines right of way as: "Land in which the state, the department, a county or a
municipality owns the fee or has an easement devoted to or required for the use as a
public road."

26. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So. 2d 687 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
27. Pensacola Scrap Processors, Inc. v. State Rd. Dep't, 188 So. 2d 38 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1966), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1966).
28. Intercoastal Drydock, Inc. v. State Rd. Dep't, 203 So. 2d 19, 20 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1968).
29. City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216, 227 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), cert denied,
109 So. 2d 169 (Fa.1959).
30. Rochelle v. State Rd. Dep't, 196 So. 2d 477 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
31. FLA. STAT. §73.071 (3) (b) (1967).
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for five years, so long as the business has been in existence for a five-year
period.32 The final requirement is that the business must be located on the
remaining uncondemned portion of the owner's property in order for business damage to be compensable.33 It is this limitation that was at issue in
the instant case, since the business was located partially on the portion of
land condemned and partially on the remainder.
The Second District Court of Appeal reasoned that the value of the
land actually taken by the county was enhanced by the operation of petitioner's business thereon, and that the value of the compensation for that
land had been adjusted accordingly. 34 The court further indicated that it
did not "see any distinction between a partial taking and a total taking
where the business was destroyed."35 The district court of appeal in the
present case relied upon Guarria v. State Road Department,36 which held that
the statute did not require an award of business damages to be severable from
damages awarded for the condemnation of real property where the effect of
the condemnation was to destroy the business by an entire taking of both the
business and the land37 This line of reasoning paralleled that of Glessner
v. Duval County,38 which held that business and severance damages flowing

from an eminent domain proceeding were identical and therefore the condemnee, upon principles of justice and fair play, should not be allowed to
recover double compensation.
The Florida supreme court granted certiorari on the basis of the application of the Guarria decision by the Second District Court of Appeal to a
factual situation materially at variance with Guarria. Guarria dealt with
the denial of business damages to an owner whose entire business was located
on the condemned land. The condemnation proceedings in the instant case
dealt with a business only partially on the condemned land. The supreme
court held that the damages to the business were statutorily compensable,
thereby rejecting the Second District Court of Appeal's argument that there
was no difference between a partial taking and a complete taking where
the effect of the partial taking was to destroy the possibility of the continued
operation of the business. In so holding, the supreme court indicated that
the statute allowed compensation where the effect of the taking resulted in
either damage to, or destruction of, a business located on lands adjoining
the condemned property of the owner. In the instant case, only part of the
land upon which petitioner's business was located was condemned, resulting
in serious damage to the remainder of the business located on the adjoining
land. The district court of appeal held, essentially, that when the effect of
32. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 107 So. 2d 51 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1958), rev'd in part on other grounds, 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959); Hooper v. State Rd. Dep't,
105 So. 2d 515 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
33. FLA. STAT. §73.071 (3) (b) (1967).
34. 206 So. 2d 405, 407 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
35. Id.
36. 117 So. 2d 5 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
37. Id. at 6.
38. 203 So. 2d 330 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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